Introduction
Two notable features of the U.S. data during World War II are the large increases in civilian employment and average weekly hours. During the first several years of the war, the unemployment rate fell to 1 percent. Once the reserve of unemployed was at a minimum, many students, retirees, and women engaged in housework entered the labor force and hours per worker increased. In 1943, the midpoint of the war, the fraction of civilians employed had risen 12 percent above its 1939 level. Average weekly hours in 1943 had risen 19 percent above its 1939 level. In the postwar period, variations in both hours per worker and civilian employment are also evident. The fraction employed has displayed annual percent deviations of about 2 percent, which is approximately 60 percent of the variation in total hours of work. The remainder is due to changes in hours per worker.
In this paper, we use the wartime and postwar experiences of the U.S. to quantify the effects of government purchases on changes in employment and hours. We develop a model and derive its predictions for the two labor inputs. We adopt the technology of Kydland and Prescott [1991] who assume that the number of hours that a plant can operate and the number of employees per plant are choice variables. All workers are assumed to work the same shift. Thus, the number of hours worked per employee is equal to the number of hours that the plant operates. One important difference between the framework of Kydland and Prescott [1991] and the model developed in this paper is our assumption about preferences.
We assume that the disutility people experience when entering the workforce differs across individuals. Heterogeneous costs are intended to capture differences between such groups as single men and married women with children. For the function that we choose, the aggregate costs are increasing in the fraction employed. Therefore, in times of large fiscal shocks (e.g., war) both employment and hours per worker are predicted to rise.
In addition to fiscal shocks, we assume that there are shocks to the production technology. For World War II, technology shocks are dominated by fiscal shocks. During the postwar, however, they play an important role for aggregate fluctuations. Cho and Cooley [1992] and Kydland and Prescott [1991] have found, however, that it is difficult to account for the large movements in employment and hours if technology shocks are the only source of fluctuations. Cho and Cooley [1992] estimate that technology shocks account for a little over one-half of the variation observed in the postwar data. Similar estimates are found by Kydland and Prescott [1991] .
We estimate the parameters of our model using annual U.S. data and a two-step estimation procedure. First, we estimate a law of motion for military employment by applying the maximum-likelihood procedure outlined in Hamilton [1989] . In the second step, we condition on the estimated process for military employment and estimate the remaining parameters using the simulated method of moments procedure of Lee and Ingram [1989] . We use the parameter estimates to make predictions about the response of hours of work and employment to fiscal shocks. We find that fiscal shocks are an important source of variation in hours per worker and per-capita employment in both wartime and the postwar period. The model accounts for the large movement in hours per worker and per-capita employment observed during World War II. The responses of output and its components are also in good agreement with the data. For the postwar, we find that the amplitude of fluctuations in hours and employment for the model is similar to that of the data.
In Section 2, we describe the model and equilibrium concept that we use. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium for different assumptions about preferences and technologies. Section 4 lays out the estimation procedure and reports the estimation results.
In Section 5, we compare simulations from the model to U.S. data between 1941 and 1985.
The Model
Our model economy is inhabited by a large number of ex-ante identical agents with preferences EY,p t {U(ct1et)-t,tX(ht>o)}, u(c,e) = (c7£1 7)1 -, 0</?, 7 <l, «>o
where Ct is consumption at date t, is leisure at date t, ht = 1 -1% is the number of hours spent working at date t, n< is a measure of the disutility of entering the workforce in date t, x is an indicator function, and E is the expectation operator which is conditioned on the initial state vector. Each period, agents receive a draw of 77, which is identically and independently distributed over time and individuals. We could also assume that agents' types are determined at date 0 and fixed through time. Assuming
With the exception of the term r)tx(ht > 0), the choice of preferences is standard. It was composed of people willing and able to take full-time jobs under certain conditions.
[T]his volunteer reserve is composed largely of women, most of whom are engaged in home housework. Of these, 83 percent are married and 40 percent are responsible for the care of children -largely children under 10 years of age. These family responsibilities obviously hinder to some extent their freedom of work." (Survey, March 1943, p. 4.) 2
We assume that an agent that works h t hours with k t units of private capital and k 9tt units of public capital produces a homogeneous good, yt, with the following production technology:
where zt is a shock to technology in period t. Note that this technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Below, we explain how the commodity space can be defined so as to avoid problems with computing equilibria.
In specifying the production technology of Eq. (2), we assume that private and public capital are perfect substitutes. If they are not perfect substitutes, then the marginal returns of the two capital stocks differ. In peacetime, when fc 9i < is low, its marginal return is high and there are presumably large gains to further investment. However, we observe most government investment in productive capacity during wartime. Private and public capital are assumed to depreciate at the same rate,
the necessary asset markets are available, the two specifications are equivalent.
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The term volunteer does not mean work without pay. The volunteer reserve were those willing to enter the labor force under certain conditions.
where it is private investment at t, i g ,t is government investment at t, and 0 < 6 < 1 is the rate of depreciation. Government investment is exogenously determined and is taken to be The technology shock in equation (2) is assumed to follow an autoregressive process,
where et is a serially uncorrelated error term which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance a\.
Note that the production technology in equation (2) exhibits increasing returns to scale. However, if we assume capital is specific to a household and that agents buy and sell lotteries over bundles of goods, hours, and capital, as in Prescott and Townsend [1984] , then we can convexify the commodity space. Suppose that agents enter into contracts which specify the number of hours to work and the number of units of capital to provide.
In return for hours and capital, the agents receive consumption goods. Let x(A) denote the measure of agents consuming c, working h, and using k, for (c, h, k) £ A. Then, aggregate output is given by
which exhibits constant returns to scale if the inputs are the measures, x.
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To compute the equilibrium decisions, we can exploit the fact that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto 3
If the set of possible (ft, k) pairs is discrete, then output is given by z Ylk ~*~ kg) 6x h,k where optimal and solve the social planner's problem. The current return for the planner is given by
where the maximization is subject to
The capital letters, K, I, L, and N, are used to denote population means of the capital stock, investment, the fraction employed last period, and the fraction employed currently, respectively. The function a is the fraction of individuals in the army and depends on the state, s. We have ignored the utility of those in the army since it depends only on exogenously determined variables. The function p is the aggregate cost function, i.e.,
where q(j) is a monotonically increasing function which represents is the cost to individual j of entering the workforce. We assume that individuals with the lowest values of rj (= q(j)) are employed first. Because 77 in (1) is independently and identically distributed, the group of employed individuals may not be the same through time. However, since the aggregate consequences are the same for this problem and one with types determined at date 0, the assumption on 77 is somewhat innocuous.
The first constraint (below Eq. (7)) for the planner is the resource constraint. Output is consumed by households (c), consumed by the government (c 9 ), invested privately (i), invested publicly (i g ), or used in moving people between sectors (m). We assume that government investment and government consumption depend on the state s. We have also included the technology shock as an argument of government consumption. This Given the return function in equation (7), the value function for the planner is given
subject to
equations (4) and (5), and the specification for the Markov chain for s. The function y in (9) is the normal density. The function 7r s /| s in (9) is the transition function for the Markov chain. Hornstein and Prescott [1993] show that for the class of problems that includes ours, the equilibrium consumption vector places mass on only two points. The first has zero hours and zero units of capital, and the agent receives Co consumption goods. The second has a positive value for hours and capital and the agent receives c\ consumption goods.
Thus, we need not search over all possible lotteries. We can restate the planner's problem as follows: oo max Sy^{n £ C/( Cl , t ,l-^) + (l-n t Mc 0 ,t,l)-p(n<)}(l-at) (11) {ci, t ,co,t,«t ,*(.»(} subject to n t c\ tt + (1 -n t )c 0 ,t + i t + i g ,t + c g ,t < *t ^ ' ~ 9 ''^ h t n t and equations (3), (4), and (5), where c\ is consumption of those working in the private sector, Co is consumption of those not working, i is private investment, i g is government
a is the fraction of the population in the military, n is the fraction of the population employed in the civilian sector, and h is the number of hours that the plant is operated. 
Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we provide a characterization of the model's equilibrium for several specifications of preferences and technology. In doing so, we hope to illustrate how our assumptions affect the simulation results of Section 5.
We start with the simplest example. Suppose that the resource (i.e., m(nt-i,nt) and utility costs (i.e., p(n*)) associated with changing the fraction of people employed were both zero. In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold at all dates t:
These conditions follow from the optimization problem described in Section 2. The first condition equates the marginal utilities of those working with those who are not working.
The second condition equates the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure of the working agent to the marginal benefit of running the plant an extra hour. The third condition equates the change in welfare due to one more person working to the additional output produced by having an additional employee. With some manipulation of these three equations we have the following condition:
Notice that this formula involves only h t and the parameters of the utility and production functions. Therefore, h t must be constant in equilibrium. Furthermore, there are only two fixed points of Eq. (15). ht = 0 and 0 < h t < 1. This follows from the fact that the left hand side of the equation is a concave function that is equal to 0 if ht = 0, equal to 1 if ht = 1, and has a derivative equal to 1 at 0. If 0 < 8 < 1, then the right hand side has a slope that is between 0 and 1. Therefore, the linear function (1 -6)h t crosses the concave function twice, once at 0 and once at some point in (0,1). We can exclude the h t = 0 outcome since it is not an optimum. Therefore, to calculate the equilibrium hours decision, we find the positive fixed point of Eq. (15).
With only the extensive margin operating, the model is analogous to indivisible labor economy. Hansen assumes that the utility function has a logarithmic form.
In that case, the level of consumption of those working equals the level of consumption of those not working (en = Cot). Therefore, the preferences are given by
where h is the fixed point of Eq. (15). This is the specification used by Hansen. Furthermore, assuming no government capital, aggregate output is given by hztk1n\~6 as in
Hansen.
The problem with assuming that all of the variation in total hours is due to changes in employment is the fact that this assumption is at odds with the data. However, if resource or utility costs due to adjusting employment are nontrivial, then an equilibrium will involve variation in both employment and hours per worker. Consider first the case with heterogeneous utilities, p(N) > 0 for some N, and a logarithmic form for U. In this case, we replace constraint (14) with
The left hand side of Eq. (16) is equal to 0 and h t = h. For n t > n, p'(n t ) > 0 and, therefore h t > h. Thus, with this specification, we would predict hours to increase if the capital stock fell below a certain level, say because of a war.
For a final example, we consider a case with nonzero moving costs. If m(n t -i, n t ) > 0
for some values of n<_i and nt, then the constraint in (14) must be replaced by
Notice that the right hand side is equal to zero if costs to adjusting employment are zero, e.g., p(nt) = 0 and m(n t -i,nt) = 0 for all nt, t > 0. In that case, hours are constant.
Otherwise, the model predicts that there will be fluctuations in both hours per worker and employment. Consider, for example, moving costs m(n t -i,n t ) = a(n t -n t -i) 2 . If a > 0, then a planner maximizing Eq. (11) would try to smooth employment over time by varying hours as well. For a large, hours per worker rather than the fraction employed would be adjusted in response to fiscal or technological shocks.
Estimation
In this section, we describe the methods that we use to parameterize the model. The model's parameters are estimated in two steps. First, we fit a markov process to military employment, that captures the effects of wars. Second, we estimate the rest of the parameters using the simulation estimator proposed by Lee and Ingram (1992) .
We start with the parameterization of the law of motion for the fiscal policy variables.
During the twentieth century, fluctuations in fiscal policy variables have been dominated by the effects of wars. We model this property of the data by assuming that military employment, government investment, and government consumption have a common finite state markov component. The markov process is estimated using data on the fraction of the working population employed in the military. The remaining parameters are estimated using the simulated method of moments estimator proposed by Lee and Ingram (1992) . This estimator minimizes a quadratic form of discrepancies between a set of simulated moments and their analogues in the data. Let
4> be an / x 1 vector of parameters, {Xt,t = 1,2,..., T} be the observations where Xt is fcx 1, and let {(Yj(4>)),j = 1,2,..., JV} be an k x 1 vector of simulated time series. 
QN(Y(<f>)) = -Y,i( Y M))-
The simulated method of moments estimator proposed by Lcc and Ingram (1992) minimizes the following quadratic form in <f>
IQT(X) -Q N (Y(<f>))]'W T [Q T (X) -Q N (Y(<j>))}.
Following Lee and Ingram (1992) 
where, £ t + T = q(Xt+ r ) -y ^QiXt+r)
and r is the number of nonzero autocovariances in q(Xt).
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In Section 5, we describe the method used to compute the equilibrium and simulate {Yj(<j>),j > 1}.
To implement this estimation procedure, we adopt the following additional assump- In estimating the means of government investment and government consumption in each state, we condition on the estimated time series representation for military employment and the implied estimates of the current state. We also condition on /? = 0.96 which corresponds to a 4 percent annual discount rate and 8 = 0.0793 which is the mean of investment over capital in the U.S. data for the sample we use.
Given these assumptions the parameter vector to be estimated is where a is a parameter used in specifying moving costs (i.e., m(n t ,nt-\) = a(n t -n t _i) 2 ), 7 is the weight on consumption in utility, a is the standard deviation of the innovation to the technology shock, p determines the persistence of the technology shock, p a and pb are parameters used to specify the costs of entering the workforce (i.e., p(n) = Pb{(n -p a ) 3 + \n -p a \ 3 }), 0 is the share of capital in production, £ governs the covariance of government consumption with technology, and the /z's are the conditional means for government investment and government consumption. Notice that several parameters have been excluded from <f>. The mean of c 9it in state 1, the means of i 9tt in the four states of the Markov chain for s t , and the risk parameter, w, were all excluded from <f>. Because the model is not suited to explain movements during the Great Depression, we started the estimation in 1941 so state 1 does not occur. In our simulations, government consumption in state 1 was set equal to its unconditional average. We set the means of i 9it equal to zero and assumed that k t + k 9tt from the data was simply private capital stock. In this case, it denotes total investment. This assumption has no effect on any of the other decision variables since the capital stocks are perfect substitutes. Finally, we set the risk aversion parameter equal to 1, which implies logarithmic utility.
We identify the parameters in (f> using the following moments q( Estimates of the parameters in <f> are reported in Table 2 and are based on annual data for 1940-1985. Our estimate of the moving cost parameter (a=0.0496) is significantly smaller than that used by Kydland and Prescott [1991] who set a = 0.5. This is due in part to the differences in data frequency; we use annual observations while they use quarterly observations. The estimate for the utility parameter 7, which is the weight on 
Simulation Results
In this section, we use the parameter estimates described in Section 4 to compute an equilibrium and to simulate time series. The results of the simulation are compared to U.S.
data to see if the model can capture the wartime and postwar movements in employment and hours of work.
To compute decision functions for consumption, hours of work, and employment, we use the procedure outlined in McGrattan (1993). 6 To implement the procedure, we derive the first order conditions of the optimization problem in (11). This derivation yields two intertemporal constraints. We use these equations to compute the consumption function for an employed agent and the fraction employed. The consumption function for those not working can be found by substituting the ci )( and n t functions into the intratemporal constraint relating the marginal rates of substitution of the different types. Similarly, the hours function can be found by substituting the C\ ti and n t functions into the intratemporal constraint relating the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of leisure.
In Figures 2 and 3 values of government spending, the planner increases the hours per worker rather than the number employed because the costs of moving high-?/ individuals are too high.
In Figure 6 , we plot a simulation of government consumption (panel a) hours per worker (panel b), and employment (panel c). This simulation is done with parameters of If the cost function is set equal to zero, the model predicts no change in hours per worker.
Between 1939 and 1943, the fraction employed in the model rose 28 percent. In the data, the increase was only 12 percent. We are currently in the process of examining the robustness of our results to alter-7 Before computing the standard deviation, we take the logarithm of the series and remove the trend with the filter described in Prescott [1986] . The realizations of s t and c t are derived from the data.
native specifications of the utility costs of entering the work force and the specification of government consumption. In the postwar period there is a significant autonomous component to government consumption that we have not yet incorporated into our analysis. civilian employment (n t ) -Persons engaged in production from NIPA table 6.8A divided by working population net of fraction employed in the military. hours per worker (ht) -average weekly hours for production workers in manufacturing from U.S. Historical Statistics from Colonial Times to 1970 series D803 from 1929-1946, then from 1947 to 1985 Citibase series lphrm, average weekly hours for production workers in manufacturing from the establishment survey. This series was converted to a zero to one scale by multiplying by 48 (weeks worked per year) and then dividing by 4536, the annual endowment of time. •Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The (2,1), (1,2), (2,3) and (1,4) elements of 71 were constrained to be zero after unconstrained estimation put them on the corner. Standard errors are not reported for the fourth row. These estimates are implied by the other three rows. °'S%-»0
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